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PROACTIVE REGULATION OF PROSECUTORS’
OFFICES: STRENGTHENING DISCIPLINARY
COMMITTEES’ OVERSIGHT OF PROSECUTORS’
OFFICES ACROSS THE UNITED STATES WITH
ABA MODEL RULE 5.1
Caitlyn B. Holuta*
In the United States, there are currently several mechanisms to deter
prosecutorial misconduct, including judicial orders, civil litigation by
defendants, enforcement actions by disciplinary authorities, and internal
discipline within a prosecutor’s office. Despite these many avenues of
oversight, none have successfully prevented misconduct to the degree society
demands. Several international legal systems have adopted regulatory
frameworks based on the theory of proactive management-based regulation,
which mitigates against unethical conduct by requiring attorneys to selfassess their internal ethics policies against a rubric of ethics goals set by
ethics and disciplinary authorities. While most U.S. jurisdictions have not
adopted proactive management-based regulations, attorneys are required by
state-enacted versions of American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 5.1 to maintain internal policies that guarantee ethical
practices in their offices. This Note argues that disciplinary committees
should meaningfully enforce ABA Model Rule 5.1 by utilizing a proactive
regulatory approach. By requiring prosecutors to self-assess and report
whether their office policies guarantee ethical prosecutions and prevent
misconduct, disciplinary committees can safeguard against prosecutorial
misconduct more than current efforts. Proactive enforcement of Model Rule
5.1 allows disciplinary committees to move beyond a defensive, ex post
approach to misconduct and, instead, utilize preventative measures that
would demand accountability from historically opaque prosecutors’ offices.
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INTRODUCTION
A 1999 study by the Chicago Tribune investigated whether prosecutors’
offices disciplined their own line prosecutors for misconduct.1 The study
1. Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Trial & Error Part 2: The Flip Side of a Fair
Trial, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 11, 1999), https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/chi-
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found that of the 381 reversals on appeal in homicide cases in the prior thirtyseven years, of which sixty-seven were death penalty cases, only one
prosecutor was disciplined for misconduct.2 This prosecutor was reinstated
with back pay after he appealed his firing.3 Only one attorney received an
in-house suspension, which only lasted thirty days.4 A third attorney had his
license suspended for fifty-nine days, but this was due to unrelated errors in
the case.5 None of these attorneys received public sanction.6
In the United States, the prosecutor’s charge is “to see that justice is
done,”7 and it is as much a prosecutor’s duty to “refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.”8 Prosecutors wield tremendous
and unique power in our legal system. This power includes the ability to
imprison people and deprive them of freedom and property, stigmatize
people as criminals, and cause people to incur legal fees to defend
themselves. However, the responsibility that comes with this power is not
always appropriately managed.9 Although most prosecutors likely aim to
responsibly discharge their duties, when individual prosecutors practice
without a clear understanding of the rules, negligently discharge their duties,
or intentionally prioritize conviction rates over justice, they deprive
defendants of their constitutional rights to due process.10 When this power
goes unchecked, violations can go unpunished and a culture of improper
prosecutions inevitably persists, even when prosecutors are found guilty of
flagrant misconduct.11
In one case study, attorney Joel Rudin uncovered a litany of misconduct
during a series of § 1983 cases against various New York district attorneys’
offices.12 Discovery in a civil case against the Bronx County District
Attorney’s Office, in which Rudin sued over the office’s “deliberate[]
indifferen[ce] to its constitutional obligations,” revealed the disciplinary

020103trial2-story.html [https://perma.cc/TY3W-KUBE]; see also Joel B. Rudin, The
Supreme Court Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their Offices or the Bar:
Three Case Studies That Prove That Assumption Wrong, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 546–54
(2011).
2. Possley & Armstrong, supra note 1.
3. Rudin, supra note 1, at 542.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71 (2011).
8. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (describing a prosecutor’s duties as
“not [those duties] of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done”).
9. See, e.g., Rudin, supra note 1.
10. See id. at 553.
11. See id.
12. See, e.g., id.
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records, salaries, and evaluations of prosecutors involved in seventy-two
misconduct cases.13
These records demonstrated that in the seventy-two cases of misconduct
in the office’s trials, only one prosecutor had been disciplined and only after
he had been accused of prosecutorial misconduct in multiple trials.14 Further,
he and thirteen other prosecutors had been involved in more than one incident
of misconduct. One other prosecutor, who was not disciplined, had been
judicially reprimanded for misconduct in four trials, while a third prosecutor
had been reprimanded in five trials.15 The sole prosecutor who was
disciplined received a deduction of four weeks of pay.16 However, after his
return, he promptly received a raise and a bonus, more than compensating for
his lost wages.17 Despite the prosecutor receiving two subsequent
reprimands and referrals for disciplinary action, the Bronx District
Attorney’s Office doubled that prosecutor’s salary over the next four years.18
The only negative comment on his evaluation was related to repeated
tardiness; however, he was simultaneously lauded for his “[t]remendous
ability to plead def[endan]ts with the weakest proof.”19 The only mention of
the judicial reprimand in his evaluation was as a justification for his decline
in productivity.20
This case study illustrates the systemic inadequacies that allow
prosecutorial misconduct to carry on without any serious oversight or
reform.21 Moreover, this case study is only one example among many that
demonstrate how internal self-regulation by prosecutors’ offices is largely
discretionary.22 Regulatory authorities likely permit prosecutors to selfregulate because: (1) they believe that prosecutors generally uphold a higher
ethical standard than other attorneys, and (2) state ethics rules require law
offices to maintain internal policies guaranteeing adequate training to prevent
repeated misconduct.23 However, all too frequent prosecutorial misconduct
illuminates the problematic lack of oversight or enforcement of state ethics
rules in prosecutors’ offices.24
To that end, this Note suggests that disciplinary committees adopt a
proactive approach to prosecutorial regulation and innovatively apply the
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 5.1. This proactive approach would utilize a self-reporting structure to
13. Id. at 538, 549–50.
14. Id. at 550.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 550–51.
17. See id. at 551.
18. See id. at 550–51.
19. Id. at 551–52 (second alteration in original) (quoting personnel records disclosed in
discovery taken in Ramos v. City of New York, No. 21770/93, 1999 WL 35015447 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 27, 1999)).
20. Id. at 551.
21. See, e.g., id.
22. See infra Part I.A.
23. See infra Part I.A.
24. See infra Part I.A.
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guarantee that prosecutors’ offices do in fact maintain “measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.”25
Part I of this Note addresses the mechanisms that currently regulate
prosecutors, such as judicial orders and sanctions, civil liability against
prosecutors’ offices with rampant misconduct, retroactive sanctioning by
disciplinary committees, and internal reprimands and discipline according to
an office’s own policies.26 Part I also explains what the universally adopted
ABA Model Rule 5.1 demands of supervisory lawyers. Part II details the
proactive management-based systems (PMBR) that have frequently been
employed in international legal systems to promote attorney accountability.27
Part III examines how increased active enforcement and oversight of stateadopted versions of Model Rule 5.1, through proactive regulation, might
enable disciplinary authorities to successfully deter prosecutorial misconduct
and examines the obstacles that could arise from this application.28 Part III
also urges the adoption of proactive regulation that would require
prosecutors’ offices to report their policies safeguarding against misconduct
to disciplinary authorities.29
I. CURRENT AVENUES OF OVERSIGHT AND RECOURSE FOR
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Recent court opinions and academic scholarship have found that
prosecutorial misconduct is frequent enough to justify more oversight and
regulation. Although to say that prosecutors need more oversight implies
that prosecutorial misconduct is a systemic problem—which does not of
course mean that every prosecutor’s office around the country is rife with
malicious prosecutions, Brady violations, and untruthful prosecution
witnesses30—the easy answer to this misconduct is to say “regulate the
lawyers,” which, of course, already occurs.31 Part I.A reviews how
prosecutors are currently checked in several ways, including by judicial
orders, disciplinary counsel, and § 1983 civil litigation brought by criminal
defendants.32 These types of regulations, however, are often either
25. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
26. See infra Part I.
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part III.
30. See David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v.
Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. F. 203, 205 (2011) (“Our findings, based on an
investigation into the professional conduct rules and attorney discipline procedures of all fifty
states, suggest that disciplinary systems as they are currently constituted do a poor job of
policing prosecutors.”); Matt Ferner, Prosecutors Are Almost Never Disciplined for
Misconduct, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/prosecutormisconduct-justice_n_56bce00fe4b0c3c55050748a [https://perma.cc/2URU-Y2L7].
31. See Bruce A. Green, Lawyers’ Professional Independence:
Overrated or
Undervalued?, 46 AKRON L. REV. 599, 602–03 (2013).
32. See infra Part I.A.
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inconsistently or rarely applied and, therefore, do not adequately prevent
prosecutorial misconduct.33 Part I.B reviews how state disciplinary
committees serve an enforcement and investigatory function that monitors
compliance with the ethics rules adopted in each state. Part I.B also discusses
how ethics authorities in every state already have a tool in Model Rule 5.1 to
hold managerial attorneys accountable for their offices’ ethics compliance.34
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct and Preventative Mechanisms in the United
States
The current ex post punitive and deterrent measures designed to prevent
prosecutorial misconduct are insufficient.35 These efforts include judicial
oversight of attorneys who practice before the courts, civil rights litigation
that criminal defendants can bring when prosecutors have violated their due
process rights to a fair trial, and disciplinary actions by judicially created
disciplinary committees that enforce state-adopted rules of professional
conduct.
As judges are the agents of authority who most publicly regulate
prosecutors, experts generally use judicial opinions to assess the frequency
of prosecutorial misconduct.36 Judges employ several tools to regulate
lawyers and provide prosecutorial oversight.37 One way that judges
discipline attorneys is by admonishing or reprimanding them by name in
judicial opinions.38 Besides embarrassment before the bar and “public
opprobrium for improper conduct,” however, this type of sanctioning cannot
lead to professional discipline unless there is clear evidence that the conduct
violated an ethics rule.39 Judicial opinions usually do not result in any
accompanying reform or guaranteed change in behavior.40 Rather, this
disciplinary tactic relies on the assumption that prosecutors will be shamed
33. See Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a
Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143, 156–57 (2016).
34. See infra Part I.B.
35. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (reversing judgment and
awarding fourteen million dollars to an innocent man on death row who was improperly found
guilty after prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence); United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d
844, 862 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[T]here has over a substantial period of time . . . [been] a pattern
of conduct or misconduct of not presenting evidence until very late, many times during the
trial.” (third alteration in original) (quoting trial court record)); United States v. Modica, 663
F.2d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (“We thus find ourselves in a situation with which
this Court is all too familiar: a prosecutor has delivered an improper summation, despite this
Court’s oft-expressed concern over the frequency with which improper prosecution
summations occur.”). See generally State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 309 P.3d 108
(Okla. 2013) (characterizing a series of prior violations by a prosecutor who committed Brady
violations, elicited false testimony, and engaged in other unethical actions as “improper,”
“inappropriate,” and “egregious”).
36. See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 156–57.
37. See, e.g., In re Riehlmann, 891 So.2d 1239, 1241–42 (La. 2005); In re Schuessler, 578
S.W.3d 762, 775–76 (Mo. 2019) (en banc); see also Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 149.
38. See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 149.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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by courts into correcting their behavior, which may be undermined if
supervising attorneys supported the sanctioned actions.41 Further, appellate
courts usually only investigate misconduct if the misconduct prejudiced a
defendant.42 If there was misconduct but no prejudice, courts uphold the trial
court verdict and may not sanction the prosecutor’s offense.43 Alternatively,
judges may refer an attorney to the disciplinary committee in a given
jurisdiction to investigate the attorney and the extent of the misconduct.44
Still, judicial regulation is often inconsistent, both in severity and
frequency, and therefore is not an effective deterrent.45 Traditionally, courts
have trusted prosecutors to act ethically so much so that prosecutorial
integrity has sometimes been elevated “to the level of a legal presumption.”46
Recently, though, courts have been more willing to acknowledge
prosecutorial misconduct than in previous decades, and today’s judges are
more likely to admonish attorneys in their opinions and refer prosecutors to
disciplinary committees.47 Even though courts now generally recognize the
problem of misconduct, they are still reluctant to discipline prosecutors
themselves.48 Courts may be comfortable identifying misconduct but
traditionally are not willing to regularly impose sanctions, despite
acknowledging the significance of the prosecutor’s role.49 This may be
because of the general respect courts have for prosecutors, as in Imbler v.
Pachtman,50 where the U.S. Supreme Court observed that a “prosecutor
stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of
constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an
41. See id.
42. See Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 51, 64 (2016).
43. See id.; see, e.g., United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1563, 1565 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“Improper prosecutorial comments require reversal only if the comments substantially
affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial. . . . Taking the trial as a whole, we conclude that
the prosecutor’s closing argument does not cast ‘serious doubt,’ upon the correctness of the
jury verdict or the fairness of the trial.” (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Willis, 6
F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1993))); United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991)
(observing that “dismissing an indictment is a disfavored remedy” unless the conduct was
“patently egregious”); United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that
dismissal is only appropriate when prosecutorial misconduct is “flagrant”).
44. See, e.g., In re Schuessler, 578 S.W.3d 762, 775–76 (Mo. 2019) (en banc); In re Rook,
556 P.2d 1351, 1355–56 (Or. 1976) (en banc) (requesting that the disciplinary committee
discipline an attorney for “animosity and a desire to punish”).
45. See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 149–50 (“[C]ourts have interpreted generally
applicable ethics rules differently—sometimes more restrictively, and sometimes less so—in
addressing prosecutors’ conduct.”).
46. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 54.
47. Id. at 73–75.
48. See id. at 62–63 (citing Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam), as failing to identify the prosecutor throughout the opinion); see, e.g., United States
v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993) (naming the prosecutor more than forty times in the
initial opinion but withdrawing the name in the final opinion despite strongly condemning the
prosecutor’s actions); United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1185 n.7 (2d Cir. 1981) (per
curiam).
49. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976); Kojayan, 8 F.3d at 1424–25.
50. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
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association of his peers.”51 Alternatively, it may be because judges feel as
though it is more appropriate to leave discipline to prosecutors’ offices to
handle misconduct internally.52 Judicial regulation of prosecutors, however,
does not often require prosecutors’ offices or disciplinary committees to
follow up with the court to report on what sanctioning they deemed
appropriate. This allows prosecutors’ offices that do not agree with the courts
to avoid enforcing the judiciary’s admonishments.53
When a court is not willing to undertake the task of disciplining attorneys
on its own, criminal defendants can bring civil rights litigation for redress as
another way to check prosecutors.54 However, when defendants prejudiced
by misconduct use the legal system to seek recourse or obtain financial
remedies, their cases often fail because of absolute prosecutorial immunity.55
Prosecutorial immunity protects an individual prosecutor’s acts performed
within the scope of the prosecutor’s duties.56 A prior criminal defendant who
believes there was unethical misconduct in the prosecution, alternatively, can
bring a § 1983 claim in federal court against the municipality or government
agency (i.e., prosecutors’ offices) for deprivation of the constitutional right
to due process.57 However, defendants only prevail on § 1983 claims if they
sue the municipality where the conviction occurred and prove that the
prosecutor’s office was “deliberately indifferent”58 to the “constitutional
obligations” to train, supervise, or discipline its agents or employees.59
Furthermore, any finding of § 1983 liability only provides the criminal
defendant remuneration or redress from the municipality and does not lead
to any corrective or punitive action against the specific prosecutor whose
error was at issue in the lawsuit.60 This shift towards institutional liability
properly places at least some degree of blame on upper-level management
and its failure to train employees but often does not vindicate the criminal

51. Id. at 429.
52. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 73–74 (citing Jason Ryan, Sen. Ted Stevens
Prosecutors Hide Evidence, Report Concludes, ABC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03/sen-ted-stevens-prosecutors-hid-evidencereport-concludes [https://perma.cc/J4C5-Y6JD]) (referring to Judge Emmet Sullivan’s
decision to appoint special prosecutors to examine the conduct of the prosecutors who tried
U.S. Senator Ted Stevens).
53. See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 149.
54. See generally Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 56–57 (2011); Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
55. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 64.
56. See id.; see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422–25.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Connick, 563 U.S. at 60; Monell, 436 U.S. at 692.
58. Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (“[D]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault,
requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his
action.” (alteration in original) (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
410 (1997))).
59. Id. at 61 (“When city policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular
omission in their training program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional
rights, the city may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain
that program.”); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297–98, 300–01 (2d Cir. 1992).
60. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 64.
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defendant who was unfairly prosecuted.61 Further, judicial determinations
of liability are unlikely to lead to significant reform. A government agency
will only make changes if it is sufficiently incentivized to implement
reformative measures instead of paying future damages for § 1983 claims. A
government agency, therefore, will only make changes in policies if it
determines that the risk of a future lawsuit and the resulting financial burden
of § 1983 damages is greater than the cost of implementing training programs
or hiring new management.
B. Disciplinary Committees’ Current Use of the Rules of Professional
Conduct to Regulate Prosecutors
In the United States, bar associations and state supreme courts adopt
professional codes of ethics, usually titled “Rules of Professional
Conduct.”62 These rules outline ethical ideals and practices that all lawyers
in the corresponding jurisdiction are legally obligated to follow.63 Most state
rules mirror the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which are
developed and promulgated by the ABA.64 Attorneys are instructed to treat
this code as the bar’s ideals of “optimal professional norms” and to use the
code, comments to the code, and ABA opinions as resources to help deal with
ethical dilemmas and conflicting obligations.65
Codes of conduct are enforceable today through state court imprimaturs,
which authorize state supreme courts to issue rules that set forth professional
guidelines for lawyers practicing in a jurisdiction.66 These codes are meant
to reflect each court’s views on professional conduct but often are enacted
verbatim from the ABA Model Rules.67 These codes, therefore, are
judicially created laws binding on attorneys who practice within a
jurisdiction.68 Despite the fact that the codes are adopted as mandatory rules
and guidance for attorneys, court opinions offer conflicting conceptions of
the purpose and force of state ethics rules. Some courts believe that ethics
rules are binding, “reflect the public policy of the state,”69 and “have the force
and effect of substantive law, and ‘govern’ the conduct of lawyers who
appear before them.”70 However, others opine that, while ethics codes
61. See id.
62. See Green, supra note 31, at 602–06.
63. See id.; Ted Schneyer, The Case for Proactive Management-Based Regulation to
Improve Professional Self-Regulation for U.S. Lawyers, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 233, 234 (2013).
64. See Green, supra note 31, at 603.
65. Id.
66. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of
Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 92–91, 110 (2009); see also CHRISTOPHER REINHART & GEORGE
COPPOLO, OFF. OF LEGIS. RSCH., CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, OLR RESEARCH REPORT: COURT
RULES IN OTHER STATES—LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL (2008), https://www.cga.ct.gov/
2008/rpt/2008-R-0430.htm [https://perma.cc/BMW2-ZS43].
67. Zacharias & Green, supra note 66, at 93.
68. Id. at 110.
69. RICHARD E. FLAMM, LAWYERS DISQUALIFICATION: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND
OTHER BASES § 1.3 (1st ed. 2003).
70. Id.; see, e.g., In re Wallace, 574 So.2d 348, 350 (La. 1991) (“The standards governing
the conduct of attorneys by rules of this court unquestionably have the force and effect of
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provide guidance, courts are not required to adjudicate as though ethics codes
have the binding force of law.71
To help enforce these ethics rules, courts also have the authority to create
disciplinary committees that implement and enforce the code.72 While
disciplinary committees have enforcement power, their actions are confined
to ex post solutions that are designed to have deterrent effects.73 Disciplinary
committees usually hear a case after it has been referred to their offices by
the courts or another attorney; disciplinary offices are usually not ferreting
out misconduct to punish.74 Instead, if misconduct is egregious enough and
surfaces in court before a judge, then disciplinary counsel will investigate
and take appropriate action.75 Although disciplinary committees issue rules
and opinions, most currently do not prevent misconduct or regulate
prosecutors proactively.76
Even though they are given this authority to act, statistically, disciplinary
committees rarely bring actions against prosecutors’ offices.77 They, like the
courts, regularly rely on internal office disciplinary actions or resort to either
private or public admonishments.78 While these admonishments are a stain
on a lawyer’s reputation within the legal field, clients and other attorneys
often do not learn about any individual attorney’s sanctions. If the
admonishing court elects to issue the admonishment privately, then not only
are the sanctions concealed from other clients or attorneys but other courts or
judges will not know about prior misconduct that could affect the severity of
substantive law.”); Post v. Bregman, 707 A.2d 806, 816 (Md. 1998) (“[Maryland Lawyers’
Rules of Professional Conduct] constitutes a statement of public policy by the only entity in
this State having the Constitutional authority to make such a statement, and it has the force of
law.”).
71. Katz v. Usdan (In re Est. of Weinstock), 351 N.E.2d 647, 649 (N.Y. 1976) (opining
that ethics codes do not have “the status of decisional or statutory law”).
72. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS §§ 2.2, 2.6, 3.2 (1986)
(discussing the history and evolution of the disciplinary committee process and enforcement
mechanisms). For a history of lawyer regulation in the United States, see Fred C. Zacharias,
The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009).
73. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 81.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. But see Erika Kubik, Illinois Becomes First Jurisdiction to Adopt PMBR,
2CIVILITY (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.2civility.org/illinois-becomes-first-state-adopt-pmbr
[https://perma.cc/N5R7-TPFP].
77. See, e.g., Ferner, supra note 30; Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U.
PITT. L. REV. 393, 444–45 (1992) (documenting the failure of disciplinary bodies to act against
prosecutors and giving reasons); Charles E. MacLean & Stephen Wilks, Keeping Arrows in
the Quiver: Mapping the Contours of Prosecutorial Discretion, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 59, 81
(2012) (highlighting “the small number of sanctions against prosecutors, relative to lawyers
as a whole”); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV.
721, 725 (2001) (describing the “rarity” with which prosecutors are disciplined); Comm. on
Evaluation of Disciplinary Enf’t, Lawyer Regulation for a New Century, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept.
18, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/report_
archive/mckay_report [https://perma.cc/K437-PWUQ] (commonly referred to as the “McKay
Report”) (documenting the inability of disciplinary authorities to respond to all meritorious
claims that the codes have been violated and assuming a need for disciplinary authorities to
set priorities).
78. See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 149.
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future sanctions. These verbal admonishments are often toothless and the
recipient lawyer may not feel any consequences of their misconduct
professionally.79
Disciplinary committees historically act retrospectively and respond to
complaints by clients who believe their lawyers inadequately performed their
jobs as attorneys. These clients often do not claim that their attorney’s
inadequacy was because of a lack of firm infrastructure or proactive policies,
and therefore it is up to disciplinary committees to determine whether the
complaint arose from individual negligence or a systemic failure.80
However, disciplinary committees have not traditionally investigated firmwide policies or taken enforcement action against managers, supervisors, or
partners who violate Model Rules 5.1(a) or 5.3(a).81 This is particularly
problematic because the result is that there is no incentive for managerial
lawyers to fulfil their ethical managerial obligations.82
1. Model Rule 5.1: Current Use and Shortcomings
The ABA, in developing the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
recognized that there were two types of rules that lawyers should follow: (1)
“first-order duties” that run directly to clients, tribunals, the profession,
certain third parties and the public; and (2) “second-order duties,” which
require lawyers to exert managerial authority and take measures against other
lawyers in their practices and against nonlawyers who work alongside the
attorneys.83
Every state, under constitutional or legislative authority, has adopted a
version of Model Rule 5.1.84 Model Rule 5.1(a) states that a lawyer who
“possesses comparable managerial authority [to that of a partner] in a law
firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect
79. See id.
80. See Schneyer, supra note 63, at 259 (stating that “[m]ost [complaints] are filed by
unsophisticated clients against sole practitioners and small firm lawyers, complainants who
are unlikely to specify any ethics rules as the basis for their allegations” and proposing that
violations of Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3 are only brought to disciplinary committees’ attention
when one firm has several complaints filed against it).
81. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 874
(1992) (finding that a significant percentage of disciplinary complaints involved “low-level”
agency problems and misconduct that could have been addressed with implemented and
enforced office policies).
82. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119, 127 (2005).
83. Second-order rules promulgated by the ABA include Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3. Model
Rule 5.1(a) states “a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses
comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.” MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2018). Model Rule 5.3(a) states “a partner, and a lawyer who individually or
together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the
lawyer.” Id. r. 5.3; Schneyer, supra note 63, at 253.
84. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 66, at 92, 110.
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measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to
the Rules of Professional Conduct.”85 Additionally, Model Rule 5.1(c)(2)
states that a lawyer is responsible for another lawyer’s violation if the lawyer
has sufficient managerial responsibility or direct supervisory authority over
another lawyer who “knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences
can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.”86
There is no question that the Model Rules apply to prosecutors—in fact
Model Rule 3.8 specifically spells out the special responsibilities of
prosecutors.87 Additionally, there is no carveout in Model Rule 5.1 that
removes its application to prosecutors’ offices—in fact, the ABA has
specifically issued a formal opinion on this topic.88
The ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility’s Formal Opinion 467 specifically outlines the “basic
requirements” that the committee believes managers in prosecutors’ offices
have as obligations.89 These obligations include establishing office-wide
policies regarding concerns about confidentiality, conflicts of interest, dates
and deadlines in pending matters, and supervision of inexperienced
lawyers.90 The opinion treats Model Rule 3.8(d) and Brady obligations as
interchangeable and specifically highlights that supervising attorneys must
ensure that subordinate attorneys are sufficiently trained in this area.91
Most significantly, however, the opinion specifically says that internal
office procedures must facilitate compliance with the state-adopted version
of the Model Rules.92 The ABA also asserts that, while these basic
obligations are essential, because prosecutors must wrestle with “intensely
difficult ethics issues,” offices may require more elaborate policies in order
to comply with the obligations of Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3.93
The comments to Model Rule 5.1 also state that the rule universally applies
to government agencies and offices, not just private law firms.94 Even
though there have not been any enforcement actions against prosecutors’
offices who fail to fulfill their Model Rule 5.1 obligations, historic
nonenforcement does not bar enforcement today.
2. Internal Discipline as a Form of Redress for Prosecutorial Misconduct
As previously stated, when courts identify prosecutorial misconduct, they
often request that the office discipline its own employees.95 While in theory
this may seem sufficient, investigations have proven that in many cases,
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1(a).
Id. r. 5.1(c)(2).
Id. r. 3.8.
Id. r. 5.1; ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 467, at 8–10 (2014).
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 467, at 8–10.
Id.
See id. at 1–2.
Id. at 8.
Id. (citing In re Myers, 584 S.E.2d 357, 360–61 (S.C. 2003)).
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 175–76.
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prosecutors’ offices do not create systematic and methodical disciplinary
guides.96
Joel Rudin recounts what he learned about various New York district
attorneys’ offices as he brought civil § 1983 claims on behalf of criminal
defendants who were convicted in cases where the prosecutors bringing the
charges violated ethics rules.97 In his review of cases in three New York City
boroughs, he found that neither the Queens, Bronx, nor Kings County District
Attorney’s Office had consistent policies for reprimanding or disciplining
attorneys in their offices who violated ethics obligations.98 More
significantly, the only available sources that documented which attorneys
violated policies or engaged in misconduct were judicial opinions.99 The
offices themselves did not maintain any records of internal misconduct that
monitored for minor policy infractions before the misconduct’s ramifications
were so great that it surfaced in a judicial opinion.100 Further, in nearly all
of the instances in which a prosecutor was reprimanded by the court, the
office elected to defend the prosecutor, justify the misconduct, and appeal the
case to a higher authority.101 While this demonstrates a willingness among
prosecutors to “defend their own,” it also suggests a lack of accountability
and a reluctance to acknowledge that there may be problematic prosecutors,
training, or practices within an office.102 This failure to publicly and
internally discipline may give the impression to prosecutors that the office
providing their salaries supports their actions, even when a judge does not.103
Judicial reliance on internal discipline is, therefore, potentially undermined
by this culture, where internal supervisors are reluctant to admit
wrongdoing.104
Rudin’s findings through discovery in his own cases led to two significant
revelations about internal discipline. First, Rudin learned that none of these
offices maintained a system for tracking attorneys who were informally or
formally disciplined by the office or even which attorneys had been
admonished or sanctioned by the judiciary.105 Second, the district attorneys
in each office testified in depositions that their offices did not utilize any
objective rubrics or guidelines to make clear to supervisors and line attorneys
what the consequences of various violations are.106
One significant consequence of failing to track when courts reprimand an
attorney or when offices discipline their employees is that those offices are
unable to appropriately discipline prosecutors after multiple infractions.107
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See generally Rudin, supra note 1.
Id.
Id. at 572.
See, e.g., id.
See id. at 557.
See id.
Id.; see also Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 70.
Rudin, supra note 1, at 544, 566–67.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 554, 557–58, 567, 570–72.
Id. at 565, 567.
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Therefore, these offices are unable to recognize when prosecutors are not
receptive to increased training or refuse to adhere to internal ethical practices.
For example, in the Queens County District Attorney’s Office, there was an
ongoing illicit “Chinese wall” policy to shield prosecutors from knowing the
existence or terms of any plea deals that their witnesses were guaranteed in
exchange for testimony.108 This policy was designed so that if a witness were
to falsely testify about receiving a plea deal in exchange for testimony, the
examining prosecutor would not be liable for failing to interject and correct
the misstatement.109 On at least one occasion, the chief of trials in the Queens
District Attorney’s Office deliberately arranged for a witness’s attorney to be
the party who conveyed a plea deal to the client so that the attorney-client
privilege would shield that witness from testifying about the plea deal on
cross-examination.110 This conduct was met with a “scathing opinion by the
trial judge” when the witness’s attorney ultimately felt ethically compelled
to reveal the scheme.111 The offending attorney, Chief of Trials Daniel
McCarthy, however, was not chastised for his behavior and was later
promoted to director of trial training.112
In Jenkins v. Artuz,113 a federal judge found that a prosecutor had “engaged
in a pattern of misconduct that was designed to conceal the existence of [a
witness’s] cooperation agreement during [Jenkins’s] trial” and that this
misconduct was “improper and, when considered cumulatively, severe.”114
Ultimately, after the office appealed the judge’s finding of prejudicial
misconduct, the district attorney’s office elected not to impose any internal
discipline for this prosecutor but very shortly after promoted her.115
These examples demonstrate a few instances in which courts have relied
on prosecutors’ offices, as the vanguards of the profession, to take instances
of misconduct seriously.116 However, in these case studies, there is little
evidence that the offices required increased training or corrective measures
or took punitive action against the offending attorneys.117
II. PMBR AS A TOOL TO ESTABLISH ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND
PREVENT ETHICAL VIOLATIONS AND MISCONDUCT
In the early 2000s, scholars and bar associations began evaluating systems
of regulation, known as “proactive management-based regulation,” that
prevent “ethical breaches.” These regulatory systems target organizational
controls and office policies instead of relying on the usual retroactive
108. Id. at 564–65.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 294 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2002).
114. Id. at 290 (quoting Judgment at 27–28, Jenkins v. Artuz, No. 98-CV-00277 (E.D.N.Y.
May 16, 2001)).
115. Rudin, supra note 1, at 566.
116. See generally id.
117. See id. at 572.
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individual discipline that courts and state bar associations utilize.118
Disciplinary boards under a PMBR system look at the “ethical infrastructure”
of a firm and, if they find any deficiencies, discipline the law firm for failing
to promote and demand ethical practices from its attorneys.119
Part II of this Note provides background detailing how PMBR is developed
and subsequently implemented in various legal systems. This part also
reviews the purposes of PMBR and how effective this style of regulation is
at accomplishing its goals. Part II.A specifically focuses on the theories and
practical concerns that led various legal systems to adopt PMBR. Part II.B
then examines the processes that PMBR-based systems use to develop and
implement their regulatory structures.
A. PMBR Protects Ethical Obligations in the Face of Divergent Practice
Incentives
Disciplinary authorities that choose to regulate the ethical infrastructure of
law offices do so under the theory that authorities can more effectively reduce
harm from misconduct by preventing the misconduct than by retroactively
punishing lawyers after they err.120 The retroactive deterrent model is
problematic because discipline only occurs after an attorney’s misconduct
has caused noticeable harm, and it is only effective if punitive discipline is
consistently and predictably enforced.121 Alternatively, proactive regulation
of office infrastructure allows disciplinary boards to ensure that internal
policies within a legal office are consistently enforced.122 Disciplinary
authorities who utilize PMBR use this tool not to regulate individual
attorneys but rather to mandate a hierarchical management structure that puts
the onus on firms to promote ethical conduct in the office.123
The general theory of proactive regulation is to prevent misconduct and to
deter attorneys from sacrificing their ethical obligations as they pursue other
goals.124 Most countries that have adopted proactive regulatory measures
did so at the same time that their legal systems began allowing external,
nonlawyer third parties to invest in law firms.125 Disciplinary authorities
were concerned that pressure from investors would cause lawyers to sacrifice
their ethical commitments to clients and accordingly wanted to ensure that
firms had measures in place to help lawyers balance these conflicting
forces.126 Disciplinary authorities were also concerned that investors might
demand that firms behave in a certain way to increase profitability—for
118. Susan Saab Fortney, The Role of Ethics Audits in Improving Ethical Conduct in Law
Firms: An Empirical Examination, 4 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 112,
115 (2014).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 156–57.
122. See Fortney, supra note 118, at 115.
123. Schneyer, supra note 63, at 240.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 238–41; see also Fortney, supra note 118, at 116.
126. Schneyer, supra note 63, at 239–40.
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example, by asking firms to put forward false testimony to win a contingency
case, overbill clients for work, or take on cases with a conflict of interest to
secure the income from the work.127 Even if there were no explicit requests
for this behavior, authorities were concerned that the implicit pressure from
third-party investors to increase revenue would cause attorneys to choose
between two conflicting paths: profitability versus ethical lawyering.128
While investors could monitor profitability and respond when they were not
satisfied, the regulatory state did not give ethics authorities the same ability
to monitor for ethics violations or provide oversight.129 Disciplinary
committees, in response, implemented proactive regulation and required
firms to self-report on the policies their offices instituted that protected
against unethical decision-making.130
B. Development and Implementation of Proactive Regulatory Measures
Several international legal systems, including those of New South Wales,
Australia; the United Kingdom; and Nova Scotia, Canada have used or are
considering using PMBR in their ethics regulatory systems.131 In the United
Kingdom and Australia, disciplinary authorities and regulators implement
PMBR by mandating that firms appoint an ethical compliance officer in the
firm who oversees governance, risk, and adherence to ethical rules.132 In the
initial implementation, Australia required these ethics officers to complete a
self-assessment process to evaluate their firms’ compliance with ten
objectives set out by the disciplinary authorities.133 The Solicitors
Regulation Authority (SRA) in the United Kingdom sets forth outcomesbased regulation that operates very similarly to the ten objectives utilized in
Other regulators, such as Nova Scotia’s Director of
Australia.134
Professional Responsibility for the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, have
recently recommended that their jurisdictions’ disciplinary authorities
implement policies that would mirror those traditionally used in PMBR.135
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 242; see also Christine Parker et al., Regulating Law Firm Ethics Management:
An Empirical Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal Profession in New South
Wales, 37 J.L. & SOC’Y 466, 475 (2010) (stating that the purpose of requiring firms to
implement ethics management systems was “to counter any increased commercial pressure on
the ethics of legal practice within [incorporated legal practices]”). For more on how PMBR
advances with consumer protection and improves avenues for recourse by clients who are
unsatisfied by ethical conduct, see Susan Saab Fortney, Tales of Two Regimes for Regulating
Limited Liability Law Firms in the U.S. and Australia: Client Protection and Risk
Management Lessons, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 230, 233–34 (2008).
131. Schneyer, supra note 63, at 236; see also Fortney, supra note 118, at 116–17.
132. Fortney, supra note 118, at 116–17.
133. See id. at 116–18; infra Part II.C.
134. For a discussion on the United Kingdom’s SRA Authorization Rules, see Fortney,
supra note 118, at 116–21.
135. Id. at 126–27 (recommending the authority “adopt[] a proactive approach with lawyer
[sic] and law firms through education, engagement, the creation of an appropriate management
systems-based approach, and [adopt] the provision of tools and training to help firms of all
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Scholarship about PMBR in the United States has led to changes in the
Model Rules, such as the adoption of Model Rule 5.1, which requires partners
in a law firm to make reasonable efforts to implement firm policies that
ensure lawyers follow rules of professional conduct.136
In countries with PMBR, there are two main features that help the system
effectuate its more collaborative and proactive goals.137 First, these systems
mandate that law practices appoint one internal attorney to be personally
responsible for maintaining and assessing the firm’s ethical policies and
infrastructure.138 Second, these systems create a collaborative environment
for regulators and lawyers to help firms develop and maintain management
systems that are more likely to help firms accomplish their ethical goals.139
The “legal practitioner director” (LPD) ensures that the management systems
are maintained and serve the firm’s ethical goals.140 The failure of these
individuals to meet the specific duty of implementing the management
systems is sanctionable and could potentially disqualify these individuals
from serving as LPDs in the future.141
In New South Wales, the LPD works with the firm to accomplish goals set
out by an independent agency, the Office of the Legal Services
Commissioner (OLSC),142 which is comprised of practitioners, the state
malpractice insurer, and academics.143 In New South Wales, this
sizes practice ethically and competently in the public interest and develop an embedded ethical
infrastructure” (quoting Victoria Rees, Transforming Regulation and Governance in the
Public Interest 51 (Oct. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://archives
.nsbs.org/unpublished/81563.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3WZ-M8J4])).
136. See id. at 115 (referencing, as an example, the New York Court of Appeals’ adoption
of Model Rule 5.1).
137. Schneyer, supra note 63, at 236–37, 240–41.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 237.
140. Id. at 240.
141. Parker et al., supra note 130, at 471.
142. Steven Mark & Tahlia Gordon, Innovations in Regulation—Responding to a
Changing Legal Services Market, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 507–10 (2009); Welcome to
the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner, OFF. OF THE LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R,
http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au [https://perma.cc/EWB6-RXUT] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) (“The
Office of the Legal Services Commissioner (OLSC) is an independent statutory body that
deals with complaints about lawyers under the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act
2014.”).
143. In 2015, New South Wales took a “backward step” and discarded the requirement that
incorporated legal practices (ILP) submit self-assessments. Regulatory authorities may still
ensure that appropriate ethics systems are “implemented and maintained;” however, the OLSC
has decided that firms no longer need to demonstrate the existence of appropriate policies
through self-assessment since the initial purpose was to help firms develop compliant policies.
Because that goal was met through years of self-assessments, firms no longer need to selfreport. This 2015 shift was condemned by two former commissioners of the Queensland Legal
Services Commission, who called for a return to self-assessment submissions and proactive
review. Still, this new policy in New South Wales does not diminish the argument for PMBRstyle self-assessments in the United States. At a minimum, disciplinary committees need a
mechanism to ensure that prosecutors’ offices have or develop compliant policies. Vivien
Holmes et al., Australian Legal Practice: Ethical Climate and Ethical Climate Change, in
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW IN AUSTRALIA: ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY LAW REFORM 461, 471
(Ron Levy et al. eds., 2017); Practice Management, OFF. OF THE LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R,
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collaboration has led to ten priority areas for firms to address in their policies,
which include: (1) negligence; (2) communication; (3) delay; (4) liens and
file transfers; (5) cost disclosure, billing practices, and termination of
retainer; (6) conflicts of interest; (7) records management; (8) undertakings;
(9) supervision of practice and staff; and (10) trust account regulations.144
All firms must address these priority areas in their firm policies, but the
OLSC allows each firm to tailor their policies so that they address these areas
with procedures that make sense logistically for the needs of their offices.145
The proactive nature of PMBR is reflected in requiring law firms and
LPDs to report on the success of their firms’ management systems by
completing self-assessments.146 These self-assessments require the firm to
evaluate and lay out example scenarios to demonstrate what accomplishing
each goal looks like at the firm.147 The LPD then measures whether the firm
is compliant according to a five-degree scale: (1) noncompliant, which
means “[n]ot all Objectives have not been addressed”; (2) partially
compliant, which means “[a]ll Objectives have been addressed but the
management systems . . . are not fully functional”; (3) compliant, which
means “[m]anagement systems for all Objectives exist and are fully
functional”; (4) fully compliant, which means “[m]anagement systems exist
for all Objectives and all are fully functional and all are regularly assessed
for effectiveness”; and (5) fully compliant plus, which means “[a]ll
Objectives have been addressed, all management systems are documented
and all are fully functional and . . . assessed regularly for effectiveness plus
improvements are made when needed.”148 While this process was in place,
the OLSC received 294 of 300 self-assessment packages in the first year with
overwhelmingly positive responses from firms, many of which found the
assessment experience to have been “a valuable one.”149
If a firm is not satisfactorily compliant,150 then the OLSC may audit the
firm and provide the necessary tools to help the firm prepare for the audit
https://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/Pages/lsc_practice_management/lsc_practice_management.asp
x [https://perma.cc/JTS7-EP2Y] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) (“As the self-assessment process
was developed to assist [ILP] to demonstrate that they had implemented appropriate
management systems under the old legislation, the requirement for authorised principals to
complete the self-assessment process under [the Legal Profession Uniform Law] is
removed.”); see also Parker et al., supra note 130, at 471.
144. QUEENSLAND L. SOC’Y, GUIDE TO APPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: PRACTICE
SUPPORT
12–16
(2017),
https://www.qls.com.au/files/bce407d5-756f-4444-8515a74600a7a081/doc20170320_QLS_Guide_to_ApprManagment_Syst_FNL.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/9GMY-8UBM].
145. Schneyer, supra note 63, at 236, 241–42.
146. Id. at 242; see also Mark & Gordon, supra note 142, at 507–08.
147. Mark & Gordon, supra note 142, at 507–08.
148. Schneyer, supra note 63, at 243 n.63.
149. Mark & Gordon, supra note 142, at 512.
150. Id. at 513–14 (citing “a returned self assessment form with seven of the ten objectives
rated as partially compliant,” “a returned self-assessment form with all of the ten objectives
rated as non-compliant,” “a trust account inspection report which raised major issues with
respect to supervision of employees and the veracity of the legal practitioner director’s
certification,” and “sixty-five complaints made against an ILP with forty-nine complaints
being made since incorporation in 2003” as reasons warranting an audit (footnotes omitted)).
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process.151 These audits take a “positive, non-adversarial approach” and are
designed so that the auditing agency assists firms rather than taking punitive
measures.152
III. LACK OF PMBR THEORY IN U.S. PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES
Current methods of prosecutorial regulation in the United States certainly
have some positive effect on regulating against prosecutorial misconduct.153
However, these regulatory methods are primarily retroactive and do not have
enough of a deterrent effect because courts and disciplinary authorities
inconsistently and infrequently impose punitive sanctions.154 Proactive
measures have historically reduced the amount of attorney misconduct in
private practice by punishing policy failures and ensuring that offices have
prophylactic policies that safeguard against misconduct before it affects
clients.155 It is similarly problematic that these same measures are not used
to safeguard against prosecutorial misconduct in our legal system. It is
probable that implementing PMBR-style measures in the United States
would create a more satisfactory check on prosecutors.
Part III.A of this Note examines what benefits PMBR might add to the
existing regulatory and disciplinary structure for prosecutors. Part III.B
examines the practical challenges that may arise that would discourage the
application of PMBR to prosecutors’ offices. Part III.C of this Note reviews
whether the U.S. legal system is structured in a way that gives judicially
established disciplinary committees the authority to implement PMBR-style
self-reporting requirements for prosecutors.156
A. A PMBR-Style Application of Model Rule 5.1 in Prosecutors’ Offices
PMBR is not a novel idea in the United States.157 In 1992, the ABA’s
Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement wrote a report,
dedicated to former ABA president Robert McKay, which recommended that
disciplinary committees create separate committees to help lawyers seeking
assistance in ethical practices or law firm management without penalty.158
Additionally, at least two states, Illinois and Colorado, have begun using
PMBR for firms in private practice. Illinois’s PMBR structure has been
mandatory for attorneys in private practice since 2017.159 Colorado’s PMBR
framework is a voluntary resource that is designed to help firms avoid

151. Id. at 514.
152. Id.
153. See supra Part I.
154. See supra Part I.B.
155. See supra Part II.A.
156. See infra Part III.A.
157. Fortney, supra note 118, at 128–30 (detailing the McKay Report’s guidance to
institute collaborative and nondisciplinary actions); see also Comm. on Evaluation of
Disciplinary Enf’t, supra note 77.
158. Fortney, supra note 118, at 128–30.
159. Kubik, supra note 76.
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discipline and prevent misconduct.160 The ABA has also sought comments
on a draft proposal to study and implement PMBR in the United States.161
Proactive management-based efforts, at a minimum, would encourage the
development of ethics policies that have thus far been missing from
prosecutors’ offices.162 In cases where offices have been required to actively
reflect on their internal policies and articulate how these policies
accomplished preset goals, they were statistically more likely to initiate
internal reform that helped their offices move closer to ethical compliance.163
Alternatively, if offices found that they did not document guidance or
policies in their offices, this requirement alerted the office to its failure to
follow Model Rule 5.1, which had previously established managerial
attorneys’ obligation to create policies.164
1. Regulatory Benefits of Enforcing Model Rule 5.1 Through PMBR
PMBR has been a productive regulatory framework in the international
private practice context. Since the implementation of PMBR in New South
Wales alone, complaints in relation to all legal practices fell about 5 percent
annually according to at least one study.165 The same study demonstrated
that complaint rates for lawyers dropped two-thirds after firms completed
their initial self-assessments.166
Results, however, were not limited to just the decrease in complaints. In
another evaluation conducted by Susan Fortney and Thalia Gordon, 84
percent of respondent attorneys who had participated in the PMBR program
in New South Wales reported that their offices had elected to revise their
policies or procedures pertaining to delivery of legal services.167 Seventyone percent stated explicitly that they had done so in connection with the
completion of the self-assessment process.168 Additionally, 47 percent of the
respondents reported that their firms adopted entirely new systems, policies,
and procedures in response to the self-assessments.169
160. Lawyer Self-Assessment Program, COLO. SUP. CT. OFF. OF ATT’Y REGUL. COUNS.,
http://www.coloradosupremecourt.com/AboutUs/LawyerSelfAssessmentProgram.asp
[https://perma.cc/PE5D-SPJC] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
161. ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO. REGUL. YOUNG LAWS. DIV., COMMENT DRAFT
PROPOSAL
(2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional_responsibility/20190306-scpr-comment-draft-proposed-pmbr-resolution-andreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7AB-643C].
162. Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 152, 172 (2012).
163. Id.
164. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
165. Results are calculated based on a July 2006 study conducted by the OLSC in
collaboration with the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, which analyzed
complaint data and returned self-assessment forms for 184 ILP. For more information on this
study, see Mark & Gordon, supra note 142, at 514.
166. Schneyer, supra note 63, at 236, 246.
167. Fortney & Gordon, supra note 162, at 172.
168. Id.
169. Fortney, supra note 118, at 122.
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Results from Professor Fortney’s study not only analyzed what actions
firms took after their self-assessments but also examined the impact that the
assessments had on firms’ management, professional concerns, ethics
concerns, and morale.170 In this study, which examined PMBR results in
Australia, the self-assessments demonstrated that proactive regulation had
the greatest impact on “Firm Management,” “Risk Management,” and
“Supervision”—the three metrics studied that related to managerial
oversight.171
In another evaluation of firms that underwent the PMBR self-evaluation
process in New South Wales, the complaint rate for self-assessed firms
dropped two-thirds compared to pre-assessment rates.172 These complaint
rates decreased regardless of how the firm scored itself on its compliance
ratings.173 The authors of this study inferred that the self-assessment process
was the cause of the decrease in complaints, not the actual compliance
levels.174
While these international results may not entirely predict how PMBR
would be received in the United States in prosecutorial work, the overall
statistical evidence demonstrates that attorneys and offices are willing to
reexamine policies or even entirely overhaul old protocols in exchange for
new systems.175
2. Cost Savings of PMBR
While PMBR would require the review of new material and an initial
development stage where disciplinary committees establish a self-reporting
program, proactive regulatory efforts have historically been less expensive
than formal hearings and reviews.176 Long-term efforts to reduce
misconduct, such as diversion programs in the United States, have
historically saved disciplinary committees time and money so long as they
effectively helped deter future misconduct.177 In the short term, these
programs cost less than processing complaints and conducting formal
disciplinary procedures.178 It is likely that long-term proactive efforts would
have the same effect on cost.179

170. Id. at 122–23.
171. Id.
172. Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How “Professional Self-Regulation” Should
Promote Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 ARIZ. L. REV.
577, 624–25 (2011).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Fortney, supra note 118, at 133 (citing Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G. T. Wolf,
The Paradox and Promise of Restorative Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 273 (2012)).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id.
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B. The Plausible Challenges of Applying a PMBR-Based Model Rule 5.1
There are also potential hindrances to implementing PMBR, specifically
as a system for regulating prosecutors. Most saliently, these obstacles
include increased time requirements and cost requirements associated with
new regulation, prosecutors’ own resistance to regulation that may alter their
legal practices, the difficulties in adapting PMBR to the varied types of
prosecutors’ offices, and potential infringement on separation of powers.
1. The Cost of Compliance
One concern with a PMBR-based approach to Model Rule 5.1 is that it
would increase the ethical burden on prosecutors’ offices and divert
resources from prosecution to “red tape” ethical checks on conduct.
Compliance with Model Rule 5.1 would require first the appointment of a
senior, supervisory attorney who would be responsible for developing,
drafting, promulgating, and reporting on the office’s self-reporting
measures.180 This would require the office to expend resources annually to
redevelop policies and complete ethics compliance paperwork.181
It is possible, however, that efforts to self-report on these measures would
be minimal, so long as prosecutors comply with the preexisting Model Rule
5.1.182 The increased cost or effort involved in developing new policies
would stem from their preexisting Model Rule 5.1 burdens and not from any
new obligation to create policies.183 There would also be increased burdens
that result from the process of conforming documented infractions and
policies to match self-reporting forms.
2. Prosecutors’ Resistance to Public Self-Reporting
For any self-review mechanism and regulation to be effective, lawyers
need to be motivated to fully utilize them. Empirical studies by Susan
Fortney have demonstrated that one concern lawyers have with conducting
internal reviews of policies for disciplinary committees are that these reviews
could be used as evidence in malpractice claims against private firm
attorneys.184 For prosecutors, the parallel concern would be that criminal
180. This attorney would take on a role similar to that of the LPD in the New South Wales
PMBR system. See Parker et al., supra note 130, at 471.
181. See id.
182. These costs would be minimal because offices would not need to invest in the labor
and resources required when directing staff attorneys to develop policies or hiring ethics
experts to assist in developing compliant policies.
183. See Parker et al., supra note 130, at 471.
184. In one study, 7 percent of respondents indicated that their firms did not conduct peer
review because of concerns about the results being discoverable. Thirty-six percent of
respondents said their firms would be more likely to conduct a review if the review was
protected against discovery. Eighty-six percent agreed with the statement that “peer review
should be afforded confidentiality so that third parties cannot discover the results of peer
review.” Fortney, supra note 118, at 141 (quoting Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners
Islands unto Themselves?: An Empirical Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 274 (1996)).
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defendants would use these reviews as evidence in § 1983 claims or in
conviction appeals when the basis for the appeal is some form of
prosecutorial misconduct.185 Therefore, prosecutors’ offices may adamantly
oppose or lobby against making such disclosures in order to shield
themselves from liability. While the primary goal of a PMBR-style
enforcement of Model Rule 5.1 would be to improve internal compliance and
advise offices, if prosecutors’ offices refused to make fulsome disclosures or
repeatedly failed to produce complaint reports, then disciplinary committees
could leverage their enforcement arms to demand compliance or sanction the
supervisory attorneys.
3. Challenges Affecting Broad Implementation of PMBR
Beyond the hurdle of implementing the infrastructure in disciplinary
committees, any steps taken to implement PMBR should account for the
nuances and idiosyncratic characteristics of various types of prosecutors’
offices. For example, prosecutors’ offices have varying concerns depending
on the populations they serve, the type of prosecutors they employ, and the
activities of each office.186
For example, rural prosecutors’ offices that only employ one attorney as
the prosecutor, or employ part-time prosecutors, will not have the same
record-keeping techniques as a larger office that may employ hundreds of
attorneys.187 Alternatively, the hierarchical supervision that larger offices
may require to support junior attorneys is certainly not useful in offices with
only one prosecutor.188 However, these smaller offices still require that
prosecutors be methodical and systematic in approaching prosecutions,
especially since they do not have colleagues who can provide feedback on
their work or check any biases they have.189 In these offices, sole
practitioners are simultaneously subject to any policies they have mandated
and must also self-regulate in the truest sense, as their own compliance
officers. It is not unrealistic or unduly burdensome to require individuals to
assess their own policies and procedures against objective criteria so that an
individual can assess whether the practices advance goals set out by the state
disciplinary committee.
Contrastingly, in urban areas, internal policies that require hierarchical
oversight are likely too large to adopt cumbersome, individualized reviews
that may be implemented in smaller offices with flat structures or single
prosecutors. Because of the variety among prosecutors’ offices, disciplinary
committees would need to ensure that the requirements for management

185. See supra Part I.A.
186. See Maybell Romero, Profit-Driven Prosecution and the Competitive Bidding
Process, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 165–66 (2017).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id.
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policies “allow[] firms the room to establish appropriate management
systems that suit the nature of their clientele.”190
4. Regulation of Areas with High Prosecutorial Discretion
There is a clear tradition of separation of powers between the judiciary and
executive branch, and prosecutors function within the executive branch’s law
enforcement powers.191 Implementation of a self-reporting system in which
prosecutors must submit a report of their internal policies to the judiciary
may edge close to blurring the line of this separation of powers.192
Prosecutors are granted the authority to make discretionary decisions and are
immune from liability and oversight for those discretionary decisions.193
Because prosecutors regularly face complex ethical dilemmas, courts often
defer to their prosecutorial judgment and decline to sanction all but the most
flagrant violations and misconduct.194 If prosecutors were required to report
to judicially created disciplinary committees and required to obtain approval
before implementing office policies guiding when to charge a defendant or
when to offer a plea deal, the judicial branch might well be infringing on
prosecutors’ exclusively executive decision-making power.195
Model Rule 5.1, however, does not mandate what policies or what specific
decisions prosecutors ultimately make in carrying out their duties.196 Rather,
Model Rule 5.1 specifies only that prosecutors “ensure that the firm has in
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.”197 Disciplinary committees,
under this Model Rule 5.1 framework, would need to ensure that prosecutors
explicitly report the policies they have in place and that offices have a
systematic way to evaluate whether their policies ensure that lawyers
conform to rules of professional conduct. However, committees would not
need to demand that prosecutors implement any specific policies or specific
language in order to ensure compliance.198
C. Can Disciplinary Committees Use Model Rule 5.1 to Integrate PMBR?
Prosecutors today, as previously stated, are primarily regulated through
judicial orders or disciplinary committee sanctions that demand deterrent
punitive action.199
However, authorities rarely impose disciplinary
measures, and when authorities do order sanctions, those sanctions rarely
190. Fortney, supra note 118, at 126 (citing Victoria Rees, Transforming Regulation and
Governance in the Public Interest 51 (Oct. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
https://archives.nsbs.org/unpublished/81563.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3WZ-M8J4]).
191. See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 166–70.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See supra Parts I.A–B.
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have substantive consequences.200 The Model Rules, which explicitly detail
ethics rules for all lawyers, are a clear and readily accessible articulation of
conduct policies that have been widely implemented and accepted, with
variations, in each jurisdiction.201 These rules all include a version of Model
Rule 5.1, which demands that managerial attorneys guarantee that their
offices adopt measures that ensure compliance with the rules of professional
conduct and ethical obligations.202
The universally adopted Model Rule 5.1 gives disciplinary committees the
authority to evaluate a supervisory attorney’s Model Rule 5.1 obligations.203
This authority specifically measures whether the managerial attorney has
guaranteed that the office has adopted measures that ensure compliance with
the professional rules.204 In the nearly universally incorporated comments to
Model Rule 5.1, managerial lawyers must make reasonable efforts to
establish internal policies and procedures that meet certain basic ethics
standards.205 The comments specifically say that all legal offices should
have policies that “detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by
which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and
property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised.”206
However, there is still a cloud of uncertainty around certain aspects of the
implementation and enforcement of Model Rule 5.1 and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct generally. For example, while it is broadly accepted
that the rules are grounded in legitimate authority, it is unclear what degree
of authority judiciary committees have in guaranteeing that their rules are
being adhered to.207 Additionally, although Model Rule 5.1 clearly states
what a managerial lawyer’s obligations are, it is unclear how these rules have
affected management efforts or prevented lawyers’ misconduct in
practice.208 Furthermore, while disciplinary committees have rules in place
that permit them to file disciplinary actions against attorneys who fail in their
obligations under Model Rules 5.1(a) and 5.3(a), it is not apparent that
disciplinary committees have the procedures, resources, or mechanisms to
discover these violations in practice.209 It is possible that disciplinary
committees could begin taking proactive measures by enforcing Model Rule
5.1 for prosecutors’ offices, particularly in light of comments to Model Rule
5.1, by requiring a proactive assessment of internal policies.
Disciplinary committees could provide oversight by establishing new
committees or tasking existing committees, such as the ABA Criminal

200. See supra Parts I.A–B.
201. See supra Part I.B.
202. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1(a).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. r. 5.1 cmt. 2.
206. Id.
207. REINHART & COPPOLO, supra note 66 (outlining each state’s source of authority for
judicial rulemaking).
208. Schneyer, supra note 63, at 254.
209. See id. at 259.
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Justice Standards Committee,210 to help develop goals for prosecutors’
offices generally. This process would function similarly to how New South
Wales’s OLSC coordinated with practitioners, academics, and prosecutors to
identify problem areas for the field and then set out goals that prosecutors’
offices should seek to accomplish.211
As discussed in Part I.C, for PMBR to be effectively implemented in
prosecutors’ offices, the judiciary would need to guarantee that a neutral
committee with varied perspectives could collectively outline goals for
prosecutors’ offices. This committee could operate as a branch of the ABA,
which already utilizes collective groups of various legal professionals to
develop rulemaking ideas and assess the legal ethical landscape, as a unique
committee established by state supreme courts or by each disciplinary
counsel.212
Before evaluating the mechanisms that offices have to guarantee ethical
compliance, the bar must determine what types of misconduct it wants to
remedy in order to protect constitutional due process for criminal defendants
and ensure ethical legal practice by prosecutors.213 Historically, prosecutors
have strongly argued that only flagrant and intentional misconduct by
individual prosecutors should be sanctioned and that this misconduct is too
infrequent to warrant reform efforts.214 The prosecutor’s perspective is that
negligence is mere “error”215 and that prosecutors who are not “adept as a
result of [their] inexperience” and who “inadvertently” commit professional
misconduct should not be subject to punitive treatment.216 This perspective
suggests that negligent action should be corrected through rehabilitative
measures, such as increased training and oversight.
The more contemporary push toward criminal justice reform and research
has highlighted, however, that negligent or reckless prosecutions have the
same effect on the wronged criminal defendants.217 While this may not
necessitate individual reprimands and sanctioning for entry-level attorneys
who misstep, it does require more broadly that prosecutors’ offices take
ownership of their training and infrastructure to safeguard against negligent
prosecutorial action.218 More significantly, because prosecutors’ offices
historically lack consistent internal discipline and training,219 bar
210. CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
211. See supra Part II.B.
212. See, e.g., Committees & Task Forces, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/criminal_justice/committees [https://perma.cc/5KLA-SSG3] (last visited Oct. 3,
2020).
213. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 58–59.
214. Id. at 58.
215. Steve Weinburg, A Question of Integrity: Prosecutors Dispute the Significance of
‘Prosecutorial Misconduct,’ CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 26, 2003), http://www.
publicintegrity.org/2003/06/26/5525/question-integrity [https://perma.cc/Q5J8-P6QT].
216. See Rudin, supra note 1, at 561.
217. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 59, 101.
218. Id. at 58.
219. See, e.g., Rudin, supra note 1, at 543–44, 563, 569 (citing admissions by district
attorneys in three New York district attorneys’ offices of a lack of disciplinary guidelines and
minimal disciplinary action).
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associations that mandate ethical infrastructure in prosecutors’ offices may
create broadly applied and consistently implemented safeguards against
negligent prosecutions or negligent decisions.
PMBR provides disciplinary authorities and law offices with an additional
tool to help prevent negligent misconduct because it targets higher-level
negligence in training and inadequate policies. In offices where supervisors
overlook repeat errors, attorneys have historically continued to practice
without correction or consequences. Proactive policies that require offices
to keep records and track sanctions or judicial reprimands would help
supervising attorneys identify which attorneys need more training and in
which areas. This increased training and record-keeping could help mitigate
future misconduct or errors by those attorneys or, if attorneys are resistant to
correcting their errors, reduce firm liability. PMBR measures that examine
and evaluate whether office policies reduce negligent behavior may reduce
the tension between concerns that individual prosecutors should not be
punished for negligence with the reality that negligent prosecutions still
result in unjust outcomes.
This Note proposes that disciplinary committees identify three categories
of compliance goals: (1) prosecutor-specific rules, (2) general ethics rules,
and (3) appropriate internal management policies. Disciplinary committee
goals must be clearly written but must also be general enough to give each
office the resources to craft its own policies that accomplish the goals in a
way that corresponds with its preexisting office management policies.220
Goals for prosecutor-specific rules should aim to prevent issues including,
but not limited to, incomplete discovery disclosures and Brady violations,
constitutionally impermissible and unfair plea deals for witnesses and
defendants, improper summations at trial, and improper charging decisions.
These goals may also include measures that ensure general guidance,
training, and oversight of the exercise of discretion. Measures within this
category are only relevant or applicable to attorneys who work in the
prosecutorial role, and often these rules are defined through precedential case
law.
The general ethics rules should encompass policies that apply to all
lawyers in the office’s jurisdiction, such as those specifically commented on
in Model Rule 5.1.221 These goals include protecting client confidentiality,
establishing proper record maintenance, avoiding conflicts of interest, candor
toward tribunals, and avoiding false testimony, among others.222 Many of
these rules are formalized in each state’s code of ethics, and since they apply
to all attorneys, they must also apply to those attorneys who serve as
prosecutors.
Finally, disciplinary committees should also set out goals that relate to
internal management. Due to the lack of consistent policies and failures to
correct, retrain, or censure prosecutors internally, disciplinary committees
220. See Romero, supra note 186, at 165–66.
221. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
222. Id.
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must demand that submissions reflect the importance of internal recordkeeping and objective internal disciplinary procedures. There are rarely
policies in place that track misconduct, public censure by the judiciary,
reprimands by disciplinary committees, or internally discovered
misconduct.223 Disciplinary committees must require that offices ferret out
persistently negligent or egregiously errant prosecutors by tracking
misconduct—whether it is uncovered by judges or internal investigations.
Offices must also have policies in place to either discipline, retrain, or
terminate prosecutors who fail to conform to compliance policies.
Additionally, offices should create internal incentives, whether
compensation-based or otherwise, that promote justice-seeking prosecutions
as opposed to conviction-seeking ones.224
After setting out these goals, disciplinary committees could move forward
to have the local prosecutors’ offices in their jurisdictions appoint attorneys
to have the compliance-related role of developing and implementing ethics
infrastructure in their offices. Their ethics responsibility would be, primarily,
to ensure that each office has compliant policies that are reported to
disciplinary counsel, but the mechanisms that their offices utilize would
consider the size, resources, and preexisting policies of each office.225
Disciplinary committees could then require those offices to report with a selfassessment annually on an objective scale to denote their compliance with
policies on a form modeled after those used abroad.226 Disciplinary
committees could also use this self-assessment process as an opportunity to
provide guidance to offices who are developing newly compliant policies.
This collaborative, advisory function would allow for a dialogue and
investigation into best practices and would allow prosecutors to receive
tailored advice on how to ensure compliance in their offices.
The obvious next concern is: what if a prosecutor’s office produces
noncompliant results and fails to meet these preset goals in its self-reported
assessment? Preliminarily, if an office fails to report that the office complied
with the ethics obligations under Model Rule 5.1, the consequence would be
that the supervising attorney would be personally disciplined for failure to
abide by Model Rules 5.1(a)–(c). According to Model Rule 5.1(c), a lawyer
is responsible for another lawyer’s violations if “the lawyer . . . ratifies the
conduct involved”227 or “knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable
remedial action.”228 However, Model Rule 5.1(a) most clearly establishes
223. See supra Part I.B.2.
224. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (stating that prosecutors must “refrain from
prosecuting a charge that [they know] is not supported by probable cause”); see also ABA
Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 467 (2014).
225. See Romero, supra note 186, at 165–66.
226. QUEENSLAND LEGAL SERVS. COMM’N, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICES SELF
ASSESSMENT
AUDIT,
(2012),
https://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/
0005/97781/ILP-Self-Assessment-Audit-Form-Version-4.pdf [https:// perma.cc/XEN6Q23W].
227. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1(c)(1).
228. Id. r. 5.1(c)(2).

2020]

PROACTIVE REGULATION OF PROSECTORS

723

the liability of the lawyer who has “comparable managerial authority [to a
partner in a firm]” if the firm fails to establish reasonable measures ensuring
compliance with rules of professional conduct.229 In a prosecutor’s office,
the managerial lawyer is the chief prosecutor and all other prosecutors who
hold “managerial or executive functions in the office.”230 This allocation of
liability is appropriate given that the highest-ranking person also has the
greatest ability to establish custom and policy.
Alternatively, disciplinary committees may elect to audit offices that have
failed to comply or have consistently demonstrated in self-reports that their
policies did not successfully advance ethics goals.231 These audits, in the
international context, examined the existence of policies and the success of
those policies in deterring misconduct.232 The audits did not second-guess
attorney decision-making for trial or counseling strategy.233 Rather, the
audits would monitor whether lawyers adhere to their internal policies,
whether the policies are consistently implemented, and whether the policies
effectively target the ethics goals set out by the disciplinary committees.
IV. PMBR AS A SOLUTION TO PROACTIVELY REDUCE PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
As a solution, this Note proposes that disciplinary committees enforce
Model Rule 5.1 in a proactive manner by implementing PMBR regulatory
schemes. Model Rule 5.1 already requires that managerial attorneys ensure
their offices have policies in place that reasonably guarantee compliance with
the rules; however, few disciplinary committees leverage Model Rule 5.1 as
a way to improve ethical infrastructure or take disciplinary action for Model
Rule 5.1 violations. Additionally, various legal systems have adopted PMBR
systems that require attorneys to self-assess their internal ethics policies
against a rubric of ethics goals and report to local authorities whether their
policies advance those goals. This Note suggests a disciplinary approach in
which disciplinary committees meaningfully enforce Model Rule 5.1 by
requiring prosecutors to demonstrate that their offices have established
policies guaranteeing compliance with various ethics obligations. I propose
these obligations include prosecutor-specific regulations, general ethics
obligations, and internal management requirements. However, this Note
recommends that disciplinary committees begin using and enforcing Model

229. Id. r. 5.1(a).
230. Depending on the jurisdiction and office, this group of “top prosecutors” includes the
district, county, or U.S. attorney, as well as “executive staff, bureau or unit heads” and other
individuals who have the authority to set policies and procedures for the office. ABA Standing
Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 467, at 3 (2014).
231. This process would likely mimic the process developed in New South Wales. In New
South Wales, the disciplinary authority may audit the firm if subsequent complaints, adverse
publicity, or other events arise that give the authorities reason for concern. This auditing
process was relatively rare, and in New South Wales the disciplinary office only performed
seven to eight formal audits annually. See Schneyer, supra note 172, at 622–23, 625.
232. See id.
233. See id.
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Rule 5.1 through a proactive framework, rather than offering specific policies
that offices should adopt. This decision stems from an acknowledgement of
the complexities involved in choosing precise preventative measures that
work effectively. Expert research and collaborative committees that unify
interested parties and comprehensively evaluate specific policies are
necessary to develop a system that works. Best practices may also arise after
an advisory trial and error period after disciplinary committees begin to adopt
Model Rule 5.1 PMBR-style regulation and evaluate the success of their
systems.
The U.S. legal system already has in place an underutilized infrastructure
demanding that managerial attorneys establish internal protocols
guaranteeing lawyers will follow the rules.234 This obligation, established
under Model Rule 5.1, requires that attorneys, including prosecutors,
guarantee that lawyers create policies that ensure compliance with various
ethical obligations, such as confidentiality concerns, conflict of interest
issues, disclosing exculpatory evidence in discovery, among others.235
As previously discussed, ethical infrastructure has been implemented in
one of two ways.236 In some countries, disciplinary committees emphasize
ethical infrastructure as a precatory and optional tool for law firms to
voluntarily adopt. In these frameworks, disciplinary committees essentially
exist with open-door policies so that lawyers can go to disciplinary counsel
for practice management guidance.237 Alternatively, PMBR is implemented
so that disciplinary authorities require attorneys to appoint compliance
counsel, evaluate their offices’ policies against disciplinary bodies’ goals,
and conduct self-assessments that they submit to disciplinary authorities.238
Similarly, Model Rule 5.1 requires, first, that managers have in place some
internal policies regarding ethics but second, that managers must ensure the
policies reasonably guarantee compliance with ethical obligations.239
Disciplinary committees could meaningfully enforce Model Rule 5.1 with a
PMBR application that would theoretically only add a requirement that
prosecutors’ offices submit the policies that they have already established.
This solution would help prevent misconduct because disciplinary
committees, which are tasked with enforcing compliance with disciplinary
rules, often do not have the information needed to unearth misconduct absent
a complaint.240 Unsophisticated criminal defendants do not traditionally
seek information about formal or informal internal policies during discovery
234. Fortney, supra note 118, at 116.
235. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); see also ABA
Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 467.
236. See supra Part II.A.
237. See generally Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enf’t, supra note 77.
238. This model is more similar to those systems in Australia, Canada, and the United
Kingdom. See supra Part II.A.
239. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1.
240. Schneyer, supra note 63, at 259 (stating that most complaints are filed by
“unsophisticated clients” who are “unlikely to specify any ethics rules as the basis for their
allegations” and suggesting that ethics rule violations are only investigated when one firm has
several complaints filed against it).
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in § 1983 claims against prosecutors’ offices. When defendants do move
forward in these cases, they are met with the nearly insurmountable task of
proving that the prosecutor’s office was “deliberately indifferent” to its need
to train prosecutors.241 In several cases, discovery in § 1983 claims did
uncover the failure of the office to keep records or establish policies that
would educate attorneys about their ethical duties.242 However, there were
no § 1983 claims or other civil liability claims brought against any of these
offices that implicated Model Rule 5.1 violations.243
Disciplinary committees, therefore, should proactively seek out offices
that do not adequately train their prosecutors, do not supervise their
prosecutors, or do not know what their prosecutors are doing. By adopting
pieces of PMBR, disciplinary committees could proactively safeguard
against misconduct and improve the criminal justice system.244 Disciplinary
committees could employ a self-reporting system requiring prosecutors’
offices to assess the degree to which their internal protocols guarantee that
their line attorneys comply with their obligations. Then, if policies do not
adequately safeguard against misconduct, disciplinary committees would not
mandate that the office adopt certain protocols. Instead, per each court’s
rules,245 disciplinary committees would sanction the top supervisory
prosecutors and require that the office adopt some rule that more effectively
guarantees that lawyers are both aware of and act according to their
responsibilities.
PMBR has historically been implemented internationally to overcome the
possible pressures from third-party investors for firms to behave in ways that
increase profitability at the expense of client care.246 The empirical success
of PMBR in legal practices where lawyers have internally divergent interests
demonstrates that PMBR may also be a tool that safeguards against
Prosecutors face similar contradicting
prosecutorial misconduct.247
pressures and are simultaneously asked to be zealous advocates that seek
convictions and guilty pleas but who must also be fair-minded agents of
justice.248 PMBR, as a proactive tool, would likely help prosecutors’ offices
balance these conflicting pressures and ensure that, despite any internal
pressure to seek convictions, there are still safeguards that protect ethics in
prosecutions.
This system would need to overcome the hurdle of clearly identifying
which goals prosecutors must use to evaluate their policies.249 As noted
above, research has demonstrated that prosecutors are typically bound by
241. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 59 (2011).
242. See generally Rudin, supra note 1.
243. Id.
244. See supra Part II.A.
245. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
246. See Schneyer, supra note 63, at 235.
247. See Schneyer, supra note 172, at 624–25.
248. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that prosecutors must “refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction” but also “use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one”).
249. See supra Part II.A.
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three types of rules, and disciplinary committees should mandate that
prosecutors’ offices abide by: (1) prosecutor-specific rules, (2) general
ethical rules, and (3) appropriate internal management policies and rules.250
Prosecutor-specific goals are codified in the widely adopted ABA Model
Rule 3.8 but also could be more clearly articulated by a committee that
reviews case law and public policy to more clearly delineate the basic
obligations that internal policies must address. Additionally, because the
current disciplinary landscape often relies on an assumption that prosecutors’
offices will discipline prosecutors who violate the rules,251 disciplinary
committees should also require management policies so that prosecutors
develop clear, systematic, and consistently applied internal policies for
punishing infractions.252
When developing the goals that prosecutors’ offices must strive to achieve,
disciplinary committees should not require specific policies. Demanding
specific policies would prevent prosecutors’ offices from tailoring their
policies to the needs of their jurisdictions or offices. This type of
micromanagement would likely defeat the purpose of self-improvement and
organic growth in the office.253 Furthermore, overregulating prosecutors
with specific policy requirements may also raise concerns of breaching the
separation of powers since disciplinary committees are agents of the judiciary
and prescribing certain policies would dictate how prosecutors perform their
duties. Instead, disciplinary committees would need to allow prosecutors’
offices to develop individualized implementation of the objective criteria.
To address another concern, authorities should not decline to employ
PMBR because of a concern that prosecutors would fail to report on internal
policies honestly. Prosecutors’ offices are government agencies and there is
a strong public interest in government transparency.254 The disclosure of
internal policies and record-keeping practices would further this interest of
transparency,255 but this disclosure would simultaneously force prosecutors
to honestly self-report. Judges in practice could see if prosecutors are
complying with their policies where relevant, but more significantly, internal
employees of the office would know whether the reporting was truthful or
not. These employees would have a duty to correct any dishonest reporting
and hold their own offices accountable.
Additionally, disclosure of prosecutorial misconduct records and the
consequent measures that prosecutors’ offices take to safeguard against
misconduct is in the public interest of transparency.256 The public should be
informed about these issues, because if it is unsatisfied with a prosecutor’s
office’s protocols, then it should have the opportunity to express this
250. See supra Part II.A.
251. See supra Part I.B.2.
252. See supra Part II.A.
253. Fortney & Gordon, supra note 162, at 172.
254. Jamie Connolly, Prosecutorial Discretion and Collateral Consequences: Rethinking
the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, 43 J. LEGAL PRO. 269, 273 (2019).
255. See id.
256. See supra Part II.B.
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dissatisfaction at the polls by voting for new elected officials—either elected
prosecutors or legislators—who can effectuate change in prosecutorial
conduct. The purpose of publicly disclosing policies and misconduct records
is not necessarily to put the public on notice about which attorneys are “bad
prosecutors” but rather to provide the public with the assurance that
prosecutors’ offices have systematic policies that track and punish various
types of misconduct and that these policies are effective. Therefore,
disclosure and self-reporting should not require prosecutors’ offices to
specifically state who received discipline or demerits but, instead, to report
on the number of incidents of misconduct and noncompliance and the
responses that their offices had to those instances.
The benefits of a PMBR program, including, first and foremost, a revision
and reestablishment of internal policies in prosecutors’ offices, outweigh the
potential challenges that regulators may face when implementing PMBR.257
Even if managerial prosecutors, through the self-evaluation process, learn
that their offices are not fully compliant, the reflection on and review of
policies may lead to greater efforts to move towards compliance.258
Furthermore, evaluation of office policies allows disciplinary authorities to
address internal protocols that permit negligent prosecutions.259 While
negligent actions by prosecutors are regularly not punished by courts or
disciplinary committees, these actions still have serious ramifications for
innocent criminal defendants.260 By allowing disciplinary committees to
assess the extent to which internal policies permit negligence, regulatory
authorities can reduce the consequences of negligent trial tactics while not
individually attacking the errant attorney.261
Even though there are concerns about judicial overreach into a primarily
executive branch law enforcement function, PMBR is a tool that allows for
judicial committees to merely inquire into the existence and efficacy of
internal policies. Disciplinary committees should not have the opportunity
to second-guess prosecutorial decision-making.262 For example, there is a
clear distinction between a disciplinary committee ensuring that
discretionary decisions like plea bargains are made with oversight,
justification, and training and a disciplinary committee forbidding a
prosecutor’s office from offering pleas to certain individuals.263
Additionally, implementation of this self-reporting under Model Rule 5.1
should not be a significant enough burden to prevent a PMBR approach.
While there may be initial costs involved in adapting policies to a selfreporting form and a reevaluation of policies in light of specific ethics goals,
most offices should not have to undertake the process of developing
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guidebooks and policies.264 These processes should already be established
per Model Rule 5.1. If an office does not have these policies in place, the
benefit of establishing consistent, promulgated guidance and training to
attorneys outweighs the burdens of any time or cost required to develop these
policies.
Overall, this is a suggestion that disciplinary committees could import
PMBR to U.S. legal practice to provide more oversight of prosecutorial
conduct. It is clear that, while many prosecutors execute their jobs without
issue, the consequences of misconduct are so substantial and misconduct
happens with enough frequency that increased regulatory efforts are
necessary.265 In an ideal scenario, implementation of proactive regulation
and self-reporting on internal policies would provide another check to assist
prosecutors’ offices in developing management techniques that sufficiently
train their employees on how to be agents of justice. If, however, issues arise
in the implementation and integration of this proactive technique, this
practice is not irreversible. This Note submits that the adoption of proactive
regulation and self-reporting in accordance with Model Rule 5.1 is a
worthwhile endeavor that would, at minimum, increase prosecutors’
reflections on their own legal practices, help prevent misconduct, and help
facilitate an equitable legal system that protects the constitutional right of due
process.
CONCLUSION
There are currently several mechanisms to combat and deter prosecutorial
misconduct in our legal system, including judicial orders, civil litigation by
defendants, disciplinary committee actions, and internal discipline.
However, these regulatory mechanisms all approach the issue of
prosecutorial misconduct with a retrospective, deterrence approach, which
has thus far been successfully countered and undermined by various external
factors. Ultimately, none of these avenues has successfully prevented
misconduct to the degree that society demands.
If disciplinary committees began enforcing Model Rule 5.1 proactively,
case studies in other jurisdictions suggest that offices would reevaluate their
policies with a more pointed and rigorous review of ethical compliance. This
approach does not create new ethical obligations for prosecutors, since
Model Rule 5.1 already demands that supervising attorneys guarantee
compliance with the rule. Additionally, because the proposed style of PMBR
does not require a submission of which attorneys committed misconduct but,
rather, a report of the office policies that are in place and a summary of their
efficacy, this regulatory reporting would not infringe on prosecutors’
discretionary decision-making in the office. Instead, prosecutors merely
need to confirm for disciplinary authorities that their offices have in place a
system to ensure compliance with prosecutorial obligations, general ethics
264. See supra Part II.C.1.
265. See supra Part I.A.
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obligations, and a recording system that internally tracks misconduct,
sanctions, discipline, and education for attorneys who violate rules.
Ultimately, by rereading Model Rule 5.1 as an enforcement tool for
disciplinary committees by adopting proactive management-based selfreporting requirements, these judicial committees may help prevent serious
prosecutorial misconduct instead of merely punishing prosecutors only after
their misconduct has already deprived some person of protected rights.

